Part II: What compatibilism ought to look like

In the previous post, I argued that the truth of determinism threatens certain conceptions of free will, but not others. That is to say, if determinism were found to be true, there would be some sense in which we don’t have free will. In this post, I will motivate a compatibilist conception of free will that is not threatened by determinism, and argue that it is a legitimate position to hold in the free will debate.

‘Free will’ and ‘moral responsibility’ are closely related concepts. It is often thought that moral responsibility requires the presence of a certain kind of agency. For example, it is thought that young children and non-human animals lack the kind of agency required for moral responsibility but that normal adult humans possess it under certain conditions. Thus, ‘free will’ can be understood as a placeholder for the kind of agency that is required for moral responsibility. There have been at least four proposed features to take its place.

1)      the ability to do otherwise (Kant)

2)    a power that makes us the ultimate source of actions and decisions (Kane)

3)     the ability to do what you want (Hume, Hobbes)

4)    the exercise of a set of psychological capacities (e.g. conscious decision making and self-control) without any internal or external constraints (Frankfurt, Dennett, Nahmias)

The first two candidates are considered to be incompatibilist, in that we cannot have those abilities or powers if determinism is true. The latter two candidates are compatibilist, in that the truth of determinism does not entail that we lack them.

Compatibilists have been accused of changing the subject. It is argued that 1 & 2 satisfy the conditions for the everyday notion of ‘free will’ that most people share. 3 & 4 do not satisfy those conditions and are thus, are not suitable for filling the ‘free will’ placeholder. Thus, compatibilists are changing the subject and talking about something else.  

It is often thought that folk intuitions should carry some weight in our philosophical theorizing, but many agree that they don’t settle the free will/moral responsibility debate. If most people think of ‘free will’ and ‘moral responsibility’’ in terms of 1 and 2, and do not think 3 and 4 are relevant to these concepts, then compatibilists would be in trouble. However, the empirical findings do not indicate that we’re in such a situation (Nahmias et al. 2006, Knobe and Nichols 2009, Nahmias et al. 2014).

If we continue in treating ‘free will’ as a neutral placeholder then the question shifts from ‘is X in accord with what everyday people think?’ to ‘is X the kind of agency that makes us morally responsible?’ The answer to the first question may constrain our theorizing about ‘free will’, but it is the answer to the second question that will make or break compatibilism.

Figuring out whether we have the kind of agency required for moral responsibility may seem straightforward, but philosophers also disagree as to how to understand ‘moral responsibility’. Understanding these differences will further clarify why many compatibilists get accused of cheating. Moral responsibility is typically characterized in one of two ways:

1)      Consequentialist MR- An agent deserves blame or praise because of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (e.g. to protect society from future harm).

2)    Basic desert MR- An agent deserves blame or praise just because they had performed the action.

In defending compatibilism, one has to state what, exactly, is compatible with determinism. Is it the kind of free will that gives us (1) or the kind that gives us (2)?

With two conceptions of moral responsibility on the table, there are now two kinds of compatibilism one could defend:

C1. Determinism is compatible with consequentialist MR
C2. Determinism is compatible with Basic desert MR

While most philosophers identify as compatibilists, it isn’t clear how many subscribe to C1 or C2. But as Derk Pereboom (2014) points out, C1 is not a philosophically interesting position to hold, as virtually everyone would be a compatibilist under that characterization. If no one disagrees with the thesis, then there isn’t an interesting philosophical debate to be had. The adoption of C1 in response to claims of incompatibilism is a lot like the following scenario.

Imagine the following conversation between two subjects, S1 and S2:

S1: I think Tom and Sarah are incompatible with one another.

S2: I think Tom and Sarah are compatible with one another.

S1: I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree.  

Problem: They’re actually talking about two different individuals named ‘Tom’.

Some philosophers seem to be in the same boat as S1 and S2. Here’s an illustration with philosophical content:

Incompatibilist: I think that determinism is incompatible with being morally responsible.

Compatibilist: I think that determinism is compatible with being morally responsible.

Incompatibilist: We have a substantive philosophical disagreement.

Problem: There’s an equivocation over the use of the term ‘moral responsible’. The two speakers mean different things.

Dan Dennett, a prominent compatibilist, seems to defend C1. He argues that holding people responsible can be justified for instrumental reasons. It’s useful to hold people accountable for their actions because it encourages good behavior and discourages bad behavior. Furthermore, Dennett points out that our social practices of blaming and praising others for their actions is one that is good, and possibly necessary for a functional society. But if that’s the only justification for holding someone responsible, then Dennett is clearly not defending C2. Dennett’s case effectively translates to saying that we ought to hold people as if they are responsible in order to achieve good end (AKA, a defense of C1). Following Pereboom, I think the compatibilist needs to defend C2 in order for there to be a substantive philosophical debate. Compatibilists who defend C1 can rightfully be accused of changing the subject, but there are plenty of compatibilists who do defend C2 (e.g. Nahmias). 

If the compatibilist conceptions of free will are enough to give us moral responsibility—in the basic desert sense—then there is no bait and switch, and compatibilism is a legitimate position to hold. In the following post, I will provide a defense of compatibilism against a number of empirically informed objections. It is said that certain findings in neuroscience and social psychology undermine our sense of agency. I will argue that these findings do not convincingly demonstrate that we lack responsibility for all of our actions. 

Works cited

Björnsson, G., & Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will skepticism and bypassing. Moral psychology, 4, 27-35.
       

Murray, D., & Nahmias, E. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 434-467.

Nahmias, E., Morris, S. G., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2006). Is incompatibilism intuitive?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(1), 28-53.

Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous, 41(4), 663-685.

*This post is part of a series on free will.