Why do
some people perform acts of evil? A standard answer is that there exists a
subset of people that are just evil by nature. Having an evil nature could be
the result of bad genes or a series of bad life experiences and decisions that
led to the person having a morally defective character. There are just some bad
apples out there that are rotten to the core. Many social psychologists argue
that this picture of human psychology is wrong. Instead of thinking of people
in terms of good and bad apples, psychologist Philip Zimbardo (2004) argues
that people should be thought of as cucumbers. While cucumbers may have
different qualities (e.g. genes, shape, size, color), they are all capable of
being turned into sour pickles. But cucumbers will not just
become pickles on their own. They need to be stored in vinegar for some time.
To understand why some people perform acts of evil, we have to look at all of
their exposures to vinegar. To extend Zimbardo’s metaphor in the other
direction, in order to understand why some people perform acts of good,
we have to look at all of their exposures to sugar. If the cucumber
metaphor is right, we might not have free will. (At least not as much as we
think we do.) In this post, I will argue that while I think cucumbers are a much
better metaphor than apples, it would be a mistake to think that the metaphor
captures everything about human behavior or that it poses a significant threat
to free will.
Both
psychologists and philosophers make a distinction between internal and external
causes of behavior (see chart below). Examples of internal causes would be
character traits, psychological states (e.g. addiction, strong desires),
genetics, the brain (e.g. reflexes, automatic processes), and free will.
Examples of external causes would be environmental factors (e.g. lead), third
party sources (e.g. bribery, coercion and brainwashing), socioeconomic conditions,
and
situational factors.
Social
psychologists believe that role of situational factors are often underestimated
in our explanations of human behavior. Some go as far as suggesting that
situational factors are the sole drivers of our behavior, and others who argue
that our moral character are weak drivers of behavior, easily overpowered by
factors beyond our control (Doris 2002). There are even those who suggest
that moral character traits (e.g. benevolence, malevolence) may not exist
(Harman 1999). I will now give a brief summary of the social psychology
literature on situational factors (c.f. Doris 2002, Zimbardo, 2004; 2007, and SEP for thorough reviews).
It has
been found that psychologically normal people are significantly less likely to
engage in helping behaviors if they are in a hurry, surrounded by others (look
up "the bystander effect"), or subjected to loud noises (e.g. a
lawnmower). People are significantly more likely to engage in harming behaviors
if they are a position of authority (look up "The Stanford prison
experiment"), given orders by a person of authority (look up "The
Milgram experiment"), or if their identity is concealed in some way (e.g.
wearing a mask, cyberbullying). On the flipside, people are more likely to
engage in helping behaviors if they themselves had been helped or rewarded
beforehand (e.g. finding a coin in a phone booth).
Zimbardo
and others suggest that situational factors can explain the occurrence of
events such as the Holocaust, 9/11, and the Rwandan genocide. The idea is that
many of the perpetrators of such atrocities were mostly psychologically normal
people like you or I. The reason why they engaged in such acts is because of
various situational factors that you or I were not subjected to. If we had been
subjected to the same situational factors, then we would have participated in
such atrocities.
If the
social psychologists are largely right about these matters, then both free will
and moral responsibility are posed with a genuine threat. If it's situational
factors that are determining most of our behavior, and we are not responsible
for being subjected to such factors, then we cannot be responsible for most of
our behavior.
In a
previous post, I discussed how brain scan studies were misinterpreted to
provide grounds for casting doubt upon the existence of free will. I think that
the situationist challenge to free will makes the very same mistake as the
neuroscientific one. In order for the challenge to be devastating, you would
have to assume that the findings in these psychological studies generalize to
all of human behavior and to all humans. I see no reason to think that they
generalize in this way. The findings are consistent with other, I think, more
likely possibilities. For instance, it may be that we a majority of people
are moral sheep, but that some of us are not really affected by
situational factors. Another possibility is that situational factors really do
affect us all in the ways social psychologists say they do, but that we are not
subjected to them on a regular basis. The idea is that our conscious will
regularly drives our behavior but that in certain situations, our agency
diminishes. I think that social psychologists have identified a possible threat
to free will, but that there is, at the moment, insufficient evidence to say
that it is a genuine threat.
Works cited
Doris, J.
M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge
University Press.
Harman,
G. (1999, January). Moral philosophy meets social psychology: Virtue ethics and
the fundamental attribution error. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society
(pp. 315-331). Aristotelian Society.
Zimbardo,
P. G. (2004). A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil:
Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators. The social
psychology of good and evil.
Zimbardo,
P. G. (2007). Lucifer Effect. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
*This post is part of a series on free will.